Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
Table of Contents

Introduction 1
The UCP and Africa 2 U.S. National Interests/Policy for Africa 4
U.S. Military Activities in Africa 7
In Search of a Unified Command for Africa 9
Option 1: Status Quo 9
Option 2: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USEUCOM 11
Option 3: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USCENTCOM 13
Introduction
The changing strategic environment constantly affects the way the U.S. military organizes, prepares, and responds to those that threaten U.S. national interests. Since its inception in 1946, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) has been revised twenty times with numerous interim adjustments to reflect changes in strategic threat assessment, technology advances, and the growing world-wide commitment of U.S. forces. 1 The September 11, 2001 terror attack significantly influenced the direction of the U.S. National Security Strategy to focus on the global war on terror and altered the UCP structure, creating a unified command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), for the first time, to emphasize the defense of the homeland. The latest UCP, effective 1 October, 2002, now has five geographic and four functional unified commands. 2 Under the current UCP, the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for the continent of Africa is divided among three regional unified commands: U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). 3 While the continent of Africa faces constant security, political, and economic crises, 4 none of these unified commands gives high priority to Africa. Yet, the continuing civil wars, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and the rising threat of international terrorism significantly affect the U.S. national interests in that region. Most of the African nations are not capable of dealing with these serious problems alone. The U.S. should give a higher priority to Africa by transferring USCENTCOM and USPACOM's African AORs to USEUCOM and establishing a sub-unified command for Africa under USEUCOM. Such a dedicated sub-unified command will allow more effective command structure to proactively shape the security environment in Africa and more effectively handle any threats to U.S.
national interests in the region. This paper will examine the history of UCP with respect to Africa, the U.S. national interests and policy toward Africa, the U.S. military activities in Africa, and investigate UCP alternatives for Africa. 12 Currently, the sub-Saharan Africa provides sixteen percent of U.S. oil requirement. With proven African oil reserves reaching over sixty billion barrels (compared to 22 billion barrels of U.S. reserves), the strategic value of sub-Saharan Africa will be even more significant in the coming years. By 2015, the U.S. is projected to draw twenty five percent of its oil from West Africa, surpassing the amount imported from the Persian Gulf. 13 The U.S. will also increasingly rely on West and Central Africa to meet projected rising demand for natural gas. As current development projects mature in Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, West Africa's capacity will increase from 9 million to 30-40 million tons per year within a decade. 14 In addition to crude oil and natural gas, the region has abundant deposits of critical resources for U.S. industries, such as gold, diamonds, copper, bauxite, uranium, manganese, and cobalt. 15 With its vast natural resources, Africa will remain strategically important to the U.S.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a significant impact on the direction of the U.S. strategy. Defeating global terrorism and preventing terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its friends became a top national priority. 16 A senior Pentagon official, Vincent
Kern, declared that "Africa has been, is now, and will be into the foreseeable future ripe for terrorists and acts of terrorism." 17 While poverty and instability alone do not necessarily breed terrorists, nations with weak civil societies and poor law enforcement and judicial systems are extremely vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by transnational terrorists. 18 Osama bin Laden, who organized September 11 attacks, once found safe haven in Sudan in the 1990s. Somalia, with a dysfunctional government, instability, and porous borders, serves as a potential staging ground for international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda threat continues to grow in East African countries including Kenya and Tanzania. (10 %), and Nigeria (10 to 20%). 21 In South Africa, a country with the largest professional military in southern Africa, has reached a biblical proportions, with the infection rates in some units reaching up to 90%. As the pandemic continues, the African militaries will loose significant manpower. The effects of the disease on African armed forces will be profound as witnessed in 1999 during a peacekeeping exercise, Operation Blue Crane, where more than thirty percent of the South African participants were medically unfit for deployment.
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Many African countries-with their militaries dramatically weakened by the disease-will likely lose control over their national security and public order, profoundly impacting the regional stability.
In his radio address following the tour of sub-Saharan Africa in July 2003, President
Bush announced "progress in Africa depends on peace and stability, so America is standing with friends and allies to help end regional wars." 23 In the past decades, various forms of internal and cross-border violence created regional instability that inhibited Africa's development to its full potential. The conflict resulting from civil wars, insurgencies, banditry, oppressive regimes, border disputes, interstate aggression, or any other violent circumstances provoke large-scale flow of refugees, ravaged infrastructure, famine, and disease. 24 Today, as two of the three largest powers in sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and Angola's role would be critical to their neighbors' security. 25 The U.S. has strong interest in expanding these African nations' capability to mitigate conflict on the continent. Regional stability is the fundamental U.S. national interest in Africa. Virtually all other U.S. interests would be threatened if regional stability is not achieved.
U.S. Military Activities in Africa
Since 
In Search of a Unified Command for Africa
The U.S. military is likely to engage in Africa when a crisis erupts or its national interests are threatened. While the U.S. military needs to remain vigilant and ready to respond to potential crises, it must also take a proactive role in shaping Africa's security environment. One way is to create a unified command or a sub-unified command to specifically focus on African affairs. 37 This section examines three alternatives: status quo, create a sub-unified command within either USEUCOM or USCENTCOM.
Option 1: Status Quo
A main issue regarding the current unified command structure is Africa's division The problem with "divided responsibility" for Africa among various regional commands is that it decreases the potential for any combatant commander to effectively influence and manage African affairs, especially when faced with other daunting missions.
As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the combatant commander of USEUCOM's main focus is on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European security. In USPACOM, the main effort is clearly on promoting a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region, where a number of security concerns exist, including Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, China, and Kashmir. 45 Given each command's many roles, the three commands have viewed Africa as the area of secondary concern and paid it limited attention. The involvement of U.S. forces in Africa has been largely reactive, only responding to crises as they occur, rather than proactively shape the African strategic environment. 46 The combatant commander of USEUCOM, Marine General James L. Jones, admitted that "We don't pay enough attention to Africa, but I think we're going to have to in the 21 st century." 47 The world's strategic environment has changed dramatically since the end of Cold
War. The era of bi-polar and symmetrical security landscape is gone. Today, the U.S. is faced with non-state, asymmetrical terrorist threats in its homeland and around the globe.
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The new U.S. National Security Strategy clearly identifies the global war on terrorism as a top priority and highlights the importance of Africa's stability to the U.S. security. The current UCP arrangement-division of responsibility for Africa among three commands and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa-does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy and meet the current and future challenges in Africa.
The current UCP arrangement "makes it difficult for the U.S. to prioritize its regional security interests and pursue them consistently. The differing organizational cultures and geographical focuses of the unified commands, along with the differing personalities of their leaders, lend an unfortunate subjectivity to US security relationships in Africa."
49
Option 2: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USEUCOM
A dedicated sub-unified command with exclusive responsibility for Africa would greatly enhance U.S. military operations to foster peace and stability in that region.
Recognizing the dramatic security environment changes that have taken place, General Jones initiated the reshaping of the U.S. forces in European theater to better meet the future needs since he took over the command in January 2003. As a part of his transformation effort, he has significantly stepped up USEUCOM's role in Africa. His view is that countering terrorism in Africa is the first line of defense for the homeland. 50 By creating favorable conditions and preventing incidents in Africa, the terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland can be mitigated. USEUCOM is actively "building ties with sub-Saharan militaries, conducting combined training-outreach exercises and providing key capabilities to states to bolster their security." 51 USEUCOM's transformation also includes possibilities for opening new forward operating bases and training ranges in Africa. 52 Potential candidates for the U.S. military presence include Mali in North Africa, where terrorist groups are believed to have set up camps and supply lines in ungoverned desert areas; Sao Tome, a small nation off of the coast of West Africa near Nigeria-the region that supplies fifteen percent of U.S. energy requirements; and Congo and Uganda for setting up refueling capability for strategic airlift. 53 As the training grounds in Western Europe diminish due to increasing restrictions on operating hours, cost, limitations on the types of weapons used, and the size of forces involved in training, the countries in Northern Africa, such as Morocco and Tunisia, offer better training opportunities with considerably less restrictions. 54 Given USEUCOM's unprecedented leadership in Africa, it would be prudent to assign all of African countries to the purview of USEUCOM and create a sub-unified command for Africa. The commander of this sub-unified command can then fully dedicate his effort on African affairs to shape the security environment in the region. A more focused leadership would result in better support, intelligence analysis, and operational planning. 55 A dedicated headquarters would also enhance interagency efforts by focusing on key politicalmilitary problems with other federal agencies. Shaping the environment is a far more attractive option in achieving U.S. strategic objectives than resorting to expensive military operations to resolve crisis.
Option 3: A Sub-Unified Command for Africa within USCENTCOM
The value of a sub-unified command within USCENTCOM would be similar to that of a sub-unified command within USEUCOM as they both provide a focused leadership for
Africa. The question is whether creating a sub-unified command within USCENTCOM is a better alternative than the one within USEUCOM. A proponent of this idea argues that Africa and the Middle East are a more appropriate grouping for U.S. security interests since
Africa shares more common interests in matters of transnational threats, oil supply, and To better support the missions of the sub-unified command for Africa, the Administration's foreign policy for Africa should include the following:
l Place a higher priority on fighting global terrorism in Africa. 59 The U.S. should increase its effort to coordinate security measures with African countries that are most susceptible to terrorist influence. The U.S. should be prepared to take pre-emptive action as a selfdefense measure when the terrorist threat is imminent.
l Support the establishment of an African intervention force. 60 The U.S. should encourage leading African nations, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola, to take on the burden of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In the past, many of these African nations' efforts have been a disappointment due to corruption, inadequate resources, and poor training. Helping to foster the development of African militaries is essential to enhance their capacity to intervene to stop genocide, deal with humanitarian crises, and fight terrorism. l Continue to focus on interagency effort. 63 Military is only one element of our national instruments of power. Diplomatic, economic, and information elements must work harmoniously with the military to achieve the maximum effect. As such, the interagency relationship and coordination is critical, especially between the combatant commander and the Ambassador in the host nation. USEUCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination
Group provides a great forum to exploit capabilities of the U.S. government agencies and to synchronize non-military efforts with military capabilities.
Conclusion
The missions, responsibilities, and force structure of a combatant command must adapt to changing strategic environment. As Africa undergoes intense transition, promise and opportunity exist side by side with the perils of civil war, transnational threats, infectious disease, and desperate poverty, which can significantly affect the U.S. national interests in the region. However, the current UCP arrangement-division of responsibility for Africa among three commands and lacking a dedicated headquarters for Africa-does not provide the ideal framework to effectively support the U.S. strategy. The U.S. must take a more proactive approach to shape the security environment in Africa. With USEUCOM's renewed leadership for Africa and USCENTCOM's priority on OEF and OIF, a dedicated sub-unified command for Africa would be best served under USEUCOM. Such a focused leadership will allow the U.S. to more effectively handle any threats to U.S. national interests in the region and foster Africa's security and stability. A peaceful and prosperous Africa would greatly enhance the U.S. security.
